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ABSTRACT
China’s music copyright collecting society and its new music platforms, find
points of commonality through constructing more efficient and profitable systems
to generate more users and greater income. By undertaking a comparison of the
various copyright regulations, cases, and statistics, this research aims to
contribute to academic science by extracting frameworks and solutions from the
United States and European licensing models and examining them in the context
of China’s music market. It aims to discover rational approaches to connect
rising technology and emerging economic incentives.
Appropriate solutions are proposed based on the influence of international
treaties and legislative progress driven by technological innovation and historical
conditions in China. In particular, this research provides answers for facing the
risks related to competitive markets, transactional efficiency, and compensation
fairness. Consequently, the conclusion anticipates further progress to be made in
China’s music market. The regulatory engagements, such as compulsory licensing
and extended collective licensing, can provide considerable answers for China’s
issues.
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INTRODUCTION
Music market policy makers in the United States and Europe are devoting
themselves to copyright reform by making music licensing more functional. In
particular, countries concentrating on the music business are all suffering
dramatic quakes 1 associated with the sharp acceleration of infringements by
information technology evolution. Diverse approaches to modernization have
introduced various legislative and commercial dispensations.2
The conceptualization of new approaches involves:
(a) Free system, with copyright immunity or exemptions such as fair use and
public domain, which tolerate the public adopting the copyrighted subjects
in the absence of creators’ permission and any compensation.
(b) Mandatory systems, based on governmental intervention, where creators
lose their rights to reject a licensing grant on their copyrighted works.
However, creators may acquire copyright compensation within the
authorities’ price-setting process. For example, the “Compulsory
Licensing” model for the mechanical right of a sound recording and public
copyright levies are within this category.
(c) Opt-in system, based on conventional exclusive copyright rules, where the
users should obtain a license from the copyright holders before operating
or adopting the originators’ copyrighted subjects.
An Opt-out system, where the creators initially grant the licenses to the paid users
on the condition that the creators retain a right to carry out a specific move to
revoke the license. For example, the “Extended Collective Licensing (“ECL”)”
framework, safe harbor (limited liability under “notice-and-take-down”
procedure), and copyright formalities 3 are included in this system. The
“Compulsory Licensing” and ECL models is significantly discussed in North
American, Asian, and European countries.4 These two models provide answers to
problems in digital music and internet technology.
The latest evolutions provoked by these two possibilities offer the modern
music industry a favorable moment to assess new copyright reforms and licensing
models to stimulate and collaborate with the new digital music scene. These two
emerging operations vigorously respond to accelerating mass digitalization and
decreasing transactional costs by distributing impartial remuneration.
Robert P. Merges, Compulsory Licensing vs. the Three “Golden Oldies” Property Rights,
Contracts, and Markets, 508 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS, 1 (2004); Christopher J. Sprigman,
Reform(alizing) Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 486-87 (2004); Jessica Litman, Real Copyright
Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 1 (2010).
2
Peter C. Dicola, Money from Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians’ Revenue and Lessons
About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (2013); Kembrew Mcleod & Peter C. Dicola,
Creative License: The Law and Culture of Digital Sampling, DUKE UNIV. PRESS, 1-5 (2011).
3
Sprigman, supra note 2, at 486-90.
4
Fuxiao Jiang & Daniel Gervais, Collective Management Organizations in China: Practice,
Problems and Possible Solutions, 15 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 221-222 (2012); Jiarui Liu,
Copyright Reform and Copyright Market: A Cross-Pacific Perspective, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1461, 1478 (2017).
1
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According to present legislative mechanisms, artistically expressive creations
are regularly guarded by the copyright regime.5 Prospective consumers of creative
works should acquire a license from the owners of the copyright before
employing the original works in a new creative and transformative process.6 The
idea of compensating copyright owners for unlicensed conduct originated in
property rights.7
In contrast, the compulsory license model is built for different purposes and
goals. In this model, the owners of copyright lack the advantageous power to
counteract unlicensed uses. Prospective users can skip obtaining the rightsholders’
permission and prevail with an adequate license by committing to the designated
rate.8
In China, the 2012 Copyright Reform Proposal led to an adverse reaction. The
local music community expressed concerns that the new compulsory licensing
model would be likely to dishonor the exclusivity of copyright and remove the
rights of compensation on copyrighted material.9 On the other hand, technological
enterprises such as Tencent, Baidu, and Alibaba tend to support this copyright
reform.10
Although the press and public information are governed by the central
administration, surprisingly, these disputes around governmental copyright
legislation were widely discussed in the mass media.11 Chinese news articles and
reports described this opposition to copyright reform by the public sector as
“arguable, fervent criticism, and urgent requests by the community.”12
This article aims to deal with three issues given this legislative background: (1)
would further expansions of compulsory licensing or extended collective
licensing cement the road to a convincing solution in Chinese copyright law to the
issue of inefficient remuneration? (2) Should such reforms be demonstrated? And
(3) how should such reforms be built in China’s music market?

5

Merges, supra note 1, at 1-2.
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That?, 12
THEOR. INQ. IN LAW 40-42 (2011).
7
Merges, supra note 1 at 1, 2-3.
8
Id. at 3.
9
Xianjin Tian, Fuxiao Jiang, Katherine C. Spelman, Daniel Gervais, Mark H. Wittow, &
Trevor M. Gates, Copyright Law of China, IP PROTECTION CHINA, A.B.A., 242-43 (2017); Liu,
supra note 4, at 1473- 74. The Chinese amendment in 2012 was criticized and regarded as a “too
narrow-minded, short-sighted, geeky and in sentive to authors’ interests” proposal. (not sure what
this sentence in the footnote is saying, should we just delete after short sighted).
10
Liu, supra note 4, at 1486.
11
Id.
12
Xianjin Tian et al., supra note 9, at 243-44.
6
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: SHAPING THE IDEOLOGY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Modernization Under External and Internal Pressure
Scholars debate whether the notion of copyright has been in existence
throughout China’s historical progression. The Chinese law professor William
Alford urges that, according to historical and cultural viewpoints, copyright in
China is not the same as the abstraction of copyright in foreign countries.13 On the
other hand, several academics in China assert that early archives suggest that ageold China established a concept of copyright similar to that of the western
countries’ intellectual expression and protection.14 Yet other Chinese law experts
bridge this divide by understanding copyright legacy as two separate issues: (1)
the safeguarding of creators’ property and moral rights; and (2) protecting the
technology and business of manuscripts printing, reproduction and distribution.15
Accordingly, the evidence of copyright protection in ancient China’s history is
vague, haphazard, and highly related to governmental controls instead of
humanity and consciousness.16
Generally, the Chinese emperor authorized privileges on official and private
publishing assignments to maintain centralized and feudal administration, censor
heretical thoughts and dissenting voices, and educate the public on correct and
permissible ideology. 17 In terms of modern legal philosophy, receiving this
publishing privilege from Chinese royalty is contrary to authorizing rights and
protection to intellectual property.18 The faint copyright consciousness schooled
by the Chinese monarchy is comparable to that of Great Britain, prior to the
Statute of Anne.19 The ancient Chinese empire shared the similar approach as
faraway Great Britain in manipulating free expression and strengthening the
monarchy's political governance through controlling the privilege of nationwide
publishing.20
Great Britain shook off the feudal system of publishing privilege with its first
copyright act, the Statute of Anne (Copyright Act 1710). 21 In doing so, Great
Britain reshaped intellectual protection and brought a notable modernization to
13

WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 22-23 (1995).
14
Id. at 23-24.
15
Id. at 22-26; Liu, supra note 4, at 1473-74; Tian et al., supra note 9, at 152-57.
16
Id.; ALFORD, supra note 13, at 25.
17
Id. at 26; Zhao Xiao-sheng (趙曉生). Zhongguo Gudai Zuizao de “Yinle Dachen” Shi
Shui? (Who was the earliest "Music Minister" in ancient China?) [中國古代最早的“音樂大臣”
是誰？], MUSIC LOVER (音樂愛好者), Vol. 3, 8-9 (1993).
18
RICHARD E. CAVES, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRACTS BETWEEN ART AND COMMERCE
310 (1st ed. 2000).
19
AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 4-5 (4th ed. 2010).
20
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA.
L. REV. 549, 560 (2010).
21
Id. at 561-62.
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western copyright institutions.22 Even so, because of geographical boundaries and
cultural gaps, such new reform of the intellectual cordon was not transported and
incorporated into monarchical Chinese society. 23 As a result, ancient China
retained its weak and inadequate system to safeguard authors’ intellectual
property.24
B. External Pressure: Wars and International Treaties
Following the two Anglo-Chinese Wars initiated by Great Britain and France
in 1840 and 1856, respectively, Chinese society was forced to accept a number of
discriminatory international treaties due to foreign invasion.25 The asymmetrical
treatment of China as a result of these treaties further subsumed several ancient
Chinese states and cities into colonial territories and subjugated their
sovereignty. 26 In particular, the establishment of “extraterritoriality” and “most
favored nation treatment” generated extraordinary trading pressure and openness
to the previously restricted feudal Chinese market.27 Foreign countries agreed to
leave China on the condition that the monarchy constructed competent and
constructive mechanisms of legal protection and enforcement more in line with
their own.28
It is generally believed that because of “external” and “internal” pressure
from the western power, the first Chinese copyright law was established in
1910.29 Although this initial proposal made a limited first move, the impact of
foreign influence arbitrarily broke China’s closed system by imposing
international treaties linking China to the global market economy.30
The extensive invasions reminded China how advanced the western modern
weapons were at that time and spurred Chinese society to improve its
conventional education and outdated science and technology.31 Under the external
and internal pressure, the Chinese empire of the Qing Dynasty launched a series
of modernizations, known as the Self-Strengthening Movement (自強運動) and
the Wuxu Reform (戊戌變法), emphasizing economic, educational, military,
political, social, and administrative frameworks.32 The modernizations also aimed
to facilitate mental permanence and state power. 33 The essential foundation to
continue these reforms would be efficient, competent, and advanced legal
22

David Herlihy & Yu Zhang, Music Industry and Copyright Protection in the United States
and China, 1 GLOBAL MEDIA AND CHINA 390, 391-93 (2016).
23
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 152-53.
24
ALFORD, supra note 13, at 27.
25
Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 395.
26
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 153.
27
Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 394.
28
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 152-53.
29
ALFORD, supra note 13, at 22-23.
30
Id. at 23-24.
31
Id. at 24-25.
32
Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 394.
33
Id. at 394-95.
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institutions. Therefore, against the background of a sharp evolution in printing
and the spread of technology, the concept of intellectual property protection and
enforcement in Chinese society can be traced from the late Qing Dynasty. This
concept started to shield copyright of composers and performers. The Great Qing
Copyright Law formed a nascent copyright institution. This was a crucial
beginning in the Chinese copyright chronicle.34
After the Chinese Revolution of 1911 (辛亥革命), the monarchical and feudal
Chinese society was transformed into the modern and democratic Republic of
China (ROC). In 1928, the Kuomintang of China (KMT) ratified the Copyright
Law, which was approximately comparable to the Great Qing Copyright Law.35
After the Chinese Civil War (國共內戰), as the KMT failed to maintain its
governance in mainland China, the People's Republic of China (PRC) took over
and built its communist legal institutions but did not put its energy towards
modernizing the copyright law at first.36 Once Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平) started to
reconnect China to the global market, a series of Chinese Economic Reforms (改
革開放) were implemented and were driven by the international supply chain.37
At this stage of modernization, as requested by the U.S. government to comply
with the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), China participated in the
Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization.38 In 1985,
China announced it would establish the National Copyright Administration of the
People’s Republic of China (NCAC) to implement and enforce modern copyright
protection.39
China’s international impact and economic progress motivated the legislation
and administration and made its’ copyright system more modern. The first
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China entered into force in 1990.40
Generally, it is believed that the PRC Copyright Law was shaped and inspired by
continental Europe’s civil law system.41 Uniquely, the PRC copyright law system
includes both moral rights and economic rights, considering both the author’s
rights to the original work and their related rights (neighboring rights) regarding
performances, phonograms and broadcasts.42 At the same time, China began to
engage with international copyright organizations. In 1992, China joined UCC
and the Berne Convention. 43 In response to a thriving global market of
phonogram sales, in 1993, China joined the Convention for the Protection of

34

Tian et al., supra note 9, at 153.
Id. at 153-54.
36
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 152-53; Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 394-95.
37
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 154; Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 395.
38
Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 395; Tian et al., supra note 9, at 154.
39
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 153-54.
40
Id. at 154-55.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 155.
43
Id. at 155-56; Stephanie L. Sgambati, China's Accession to the Berne Convention:
Bandaging the Wounds of Intellectual Property Piracy in China, 3 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 139, 140 (1992).
35
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Producers of Phonograms. 44 Since December 11th, 2001, China has been a
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO).45 In order to comply with the
minimum standards of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) and the international trading exercises, China launched a
series of reforms on copyright legislation and practices. 46 As a result of their
international involvement, the Chinese government enacted the first copyright
amendment in 2001 and a second amendment in 2010.47
C. Internal Incentives: Legal Litigations and Cultural Consensus
Although China's population is 1.411 billion, the largest of any country in the
world, its music market is relatively small and undeveloped. For example,
according to the 2019 International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
(IFPI) Annual Global Music Report, China ranked only as the seventh largest
music market in 2018 in spite of rising internet usage and an established online
payment systems which contributed indirectly to China's digital music market
growth. 48 While streaming businesses have become the biggest players in the
United States music market,49 Chinese QQ Music’s valuation per subscriber was
five times that of Spotify in 2016.50 To put QQ Music’s valuation in context, the
total Chinese transaction market is 41% of the total United States transaction
market whereas the Chinese music market is merely 1.5% of the United States’
market. 51
01
02
03
04
05

Table 1：2018 Top Ten Music Markets 52
USA
06 South Korea
Japan
07 China
UK
08 Australia
Germany
09 Canada
France
10 Brazil

It is also worth noting that China’s GDP is about 60% of that of the United
States, whereas the Chinese music market is merely 10% of the United States

44

Tian et al., supra note 9, at 155-56.
Id.; Herlihy & Zhang, supra note 22, at 395.
46
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 156.
47
Id.; Xiao Xiong-lin (蕭雄淋), Zhongguo Dalu Zhezuoquanfa Xiuzheng Caoan Di 2 Gao de
Ruogan Wenti (Some Issues Concerning the Second Amendment Draft of the Copyright Law in
China) [中國大陸著作權法修正草案第二稿的若干問題 ]，INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
JOURNAL (智慧財產權月刊), Vol. 173, 5-6 (2013).
48
INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI GLOBAL MUSIC REPORT 2019: STATE OF
THE INDUSTRY 13 (2019) [hereinafter IFPI REPORT 2019].
49
THE RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., 2015 U.S. CONSUMER MUSIC PROFILE (2015).
50
Mark Mulligan, Is QQ Music Worth $10 Billion?, MIDIA (Sep. 7, 2017), https://www.
midiaresearch.com/blog/is-qq-music-worth-10-billion.
51
Id.
52
IFPI REPORT 2019, supra note 48.
45
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market. 53 The Chinese music market is remarkably incommensurate with the
entire market economy, although it is growing continuously in recent years.54
Figure 1: Annual GDP in the United States and China from 2015 to 201855
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25000
20000

18745

18238

15000

11062

19543

20612
13895

12310

11233

10000
5000
0
2015

2016
United States

2017

2018

China

Figure 2: Music Industry Revenue in the United States and China from 2015
to 201856
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Jiarui Liu, Copyright for Blockheads: An Empirical Study of Market Incentive and Intrinsic
Motivation, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 474, 543 (2015).
54
Id.
55
U.S. and China annual GDP from 2014 to 2017, THE WORLD BANK DATA BANK,
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2
(under
Variables
select
“World
Development Indicators” under Database; “United States” and “China” under Country; “GDP
(current US$)” under Series; and “2014,” “2015,” “2016,” and “2017” under Time; then click the
“Apply Changes” option).
56
THE RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM. (RIAA), supra note 52; PWC CN, CHINA
ENTERTAINMENT AND MEDIA OUTLOOK 2016-2020 55 (Nov. 2016), https://www.pwccn.
com/en/entertainment-media/em-china-outlook-nov2016.pdf (Statistics recompiled by author).
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When discussing the completely different development of the music markets
of the United States and China, it is meaningful to review both the empirical
results as to whether copyright law protects music creators and the practical legal
problems now faced by the Chinese music market. Recent statistics by King &
Wood Mallesons Legal Miner ( 金 杜 律 師 事 務 所 法 律 研 究 院 ) suggest an
increasing number of disputes around copyright ownership and commercialization
of audiovisual works.57 There was a considerable leap in the number of copyright
ownership disputes in 2017.58 Between 2013 and 2016, there were less than 10
cases per year; however, in 2017, the number of cases rose suddenly to 130.59
Moreover, copyright licensing disputes make up the largest category of cases
related to copyright contracts, constituting 55.75% of the total cases, while the
growth rate of copyright ownership issues is 524%, making it the most frequently
cited cause of action. 60 This phenomenon points out that disputes regarding
copyright ownership in the audiovisual industry have been upgraded to a crisis
level. In addition, this report indicates that digital technology has made the trend
of collective works turn into a complicated issue for the judicial courts in China.
Thus, strengthening the accuracy of information about copyright ownership will
be essential for the efficient functioning of the licensing process. Helping judges
draw a clear line to identify the accurate copyright owners and safeguard their
copyright remuneration will be a valuable task for the current Chinese audiovisual
industry.61
The most common types of infringement claims are over information network
dissemination rights of other works (4,593 cases), downloading or forwarding of
videos of others without prior consent (2,397 cases), and the failure of a platform
to comply with the rule of “Notification-Remove” or the “Red Flag Principle
(1,466 cases).62 Between 2013 and 2017, the overall copyright damage awards
concerning audiovisual programs reached 715,928,667 RMB. 63 The greatest
damage awarded to an individual case is 27,426,152 RMB, however, the average
damage awarded by the courts is merely 15,665.49 RMB. 64 The three courts
awarding the greatest average damages are the Third Intermediate People's Court
of Beijing, the Tianjin First Intermediate People's Court, and the High People's

57

KING & WOOD MALLESONS LEGAL MINER (金杜律師事務所法律研究院), Shiting Jiemu
Zhezuoquan Sifa Baohu Shiwu Zongshu ji Daziliao Fenxi Baipishu, (視聽節目著作權司法保護
實務綜述及大資料分析白皮書) [White Paper for a Practical Overview and Big Data Analytics
of Judicial Precedent for Copyright Disputes in Audiovisual Programs], 1-3 (Mar. 7, 2019),
58
Id. at 3-4.
59
Id. at 4-5.
60
Id. at 5-6.
61
Id. at 6; Beijing IP House Network Technology Co., Ltd.(北京知產寶網路科技發展有限
公司), Yingshi Hangye Zhihui Caichanquan Anjian Ziliao Fenxi Baogao (Statistical Analysis
Report on Intellectual Property Cases in the Film and Television Industry) [影視行業智慧財產權
案件資料分析報告（2016.7-2017.6)], 6, 8 (2017).
62
Id. KING & WOOD MALLESONS LEGAL MINER, at 6-7.
63
Id. at 7.
64
Id. at 8-9.
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Court of Shaanxi Province.65
Overall, the importance of increasing the commercialization of intellectual
property and pushing for copyright reform around technological impacts on
audiovisual media is revealed in several previously discussed articles: the New
State Council Decision on Intellectual Property Strategy For China as a Strong IP
Country and Forecasting the Impact of the Third Plenum on IP Adjudication.66
The substantial increase of copyright infringement disputes over audiovisual
media demonstrates continuing problems with on-line infringements of Usergenerated Content (UGC), Generated Content (GC), Professional User Generated
Content (PUGC), and Internet Service Providers (ISP). It also demonstrates that
the legal arguments over copyright categories, attribution, mechanisms for
addressing copyright infringement and liability, and the burden of proof and
evidence are still the most notable fundamental aspects of the legal system for
Chinese courts and relevant audio-visual media businesses in China.
D. Noticeable Consumer Behavior and Rising Economic Potentials
The consistent growth of the music market in the 21st Century necessitates
essential legal reform and continuous, innovative breakthroughs of digital
technologies.67 Based on the ethical and, historically, political controls, musical
expression and production in the Chinese market is primarily for preserving
cultural traditions and passing meaningful rhythm across generations.
Nevertheless, dramatic developments in technology and the global economy have
spurred the Chinese music market to consider increased copyright protection.
For the Chinese music market, two important current phenomena are the
noticeable changes in consumer behavior and a technology-led boost in economic
potential for the market. In some future trend assessments, China is predicted to
create about 25% revenue growth in the coming five years.68 As the main digital
music format changes all around the world, annual music revenue from
downloads will stay steady and even decrease slightly and gradually.69 In contrast,
streaming music has become the more profitable and prevalent method of music
distribution, which means developments in digital technology have twisted habits
of receiving music content dramatically, and China is not an exception. As the
shift towards digital distribution, particularly streaming, continues, China, as the
65

Id. at 9-10.
National Intellectual Property Administration, Chronicle of Intellectual Property Strategies
for China in Ten Years (Jun. 6, 2018), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/ztzl/gjzscqzlgybbssszn/sznjdbd/11
25007.htm; Forecasting the Impact of the Third Plenum on IP Adjudication, CHINA IPR (Dec. 10,
2013), https://chinaipr.com/2013/12/10/forecasting-the-impact-of-the-third-plenum-on-ipadjudication/.
67
John Fangjun Li & Guy Morrow, Strategic Leadership in China’s Music Industry: A Case
Study of the Shanghai Audio Visual Press, in ARTS LEADERSHIP: INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES
83-95 (Jo Caust ed., 2013); Liang Chen, China’s Creative Industries: Copyright, Social Network
Market and the Business of Culture in a Digital Age, 15 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y, 157, 157-58
(2013); Sgambati, supra note 43, at 150-53.
68
IFPI REPORT 2019, supra note 48.
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largest source of end consumers, will require a reasonable licensing system
protective of the rights of its musical creators. Moreover, China continually has
more consumers of digital music than other regions, and that means that the
establishment of a reasonable licensing system will deeply affect Chinese
creators’ music copyright protections.
Figure 3: Major Channels for Music Access in China70

Figure 4: Forecasted Digital Music Revenue in China from 2019 to 202371
(CN¥ Millions)
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Liu, supra note 53, at 467, 543 (Figure 19).
Digital Media Report 2019 –Digital Music, STATISTA, 1, 5 (Apr. 2019), https://www
.statista.com/study/44526/digital-media-report/.
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Figure 5：Forecasted Number of Music Streaming Users by 202372
(Millions)

With an extensive consumer base for musical content, music creators in China
should have higher expected revenue from the licensing system. However, music
management organizations in China seem to lack an effective and reliable
licensing and economic incentive procedure. Around 70% of Chinese musicians
presently have experience with technological approaches, such as digital
platforms and the internet, 73 but about 75% of them never received copyrightbased profit from digital platforms, or from an agent.74Among those who did earn
money from the digital approach, almost half received less than 100 RMB (about
15 USD) per year. 75 In other words, when digital platforms (streaming media,
music downloads, and Apps) become the main access mode for music creators
and consumers, the environment of the music business and the licensing system
will be faced with a new situation. It will require novel perspectives to encourage
culturally creative behaviors with proper incentives and useful licensing models.
72
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ART (音樂與錄音藝術學院), 32-33 (2018).
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Figure 6：Chinese Musicians’ Earnings Position from Digital Platforms76

Several significant players in China like Tencent, Alibaba, and NetEase,
continue to be criticized for the shortage of copyright categories, such as the
robust protection of performance and broadcast rights for sound recordings. 77
Record labels and the Mandarin music industry consider these protections to be
great economic compensation and incentive. 78 In particular, Tencent, China's
76
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biggest music streaming company, represents the cutting edge of Chinese
technological enterprises, and is also the mothership of three national music
streaming, companies, QQ Music (QQ 音樂), Kuwo (酷我音樂) and Kugou (酷
狗音樂).79 In 2018, it had a strong grip on the market, claiming 800 million users,
three times more than Spotify; however, only about four percent of those users
pay for a subscription, as compared with 45 % on Spotify.80
Market leader Tencent solidified its position when it dramatically
consolidated the market by merging its repertoire with NetEase (網易), the other
prevailing competitor in the Chinese digital music market. This collaboration will
actually strengthen the dissemination and communication of the Mandarin music
market’s musical works and sound recordings since Tencent has also connected
its music with other sizeable participants in Chinese music market, including
iTunes, 81 Alibaba Music (阿里巴巴音樂), 82 Taihe Music Group (太合音樂集
團),83 Changba (唱吧),84 and Taiwan’s KKBOX.85
II. ESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION, ENFORCEMENT AND
LICENSING SYSTEMS
Theories of how to establish effective copyright protection, enforcement, and
licensing systems move as quickly as the underlying technology fuels systemic
change. The more thriving the Chinese digital music market is, the greater the gap
between the encouraging music scene and real received economic payback. As
some empirical investigations show, the main reason that over half of Chinese
consumers search for free music sources instead of paid-for sources is that
payment functions and procedures are not appealing or convenient.86
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Figure 7: Consumer Behavior When Required to Pay for Music that They
Want to Listen to in China in 201687

Figure 8: Reasons for Consumers Not to Pay for Online Music in China in
201688

Shuwei Yinle Daziliao Baogao：Zhongguo Xianmin Shouji Tingge Hangwei Jiemi ( 數位音
樂大資料報告：中國線民手機聽歌行為揭秘) [Digital Music Big Data Report: Chinese Music
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The Chinese music market has become highly globalized and diverse. A
paradox exists, as most Chinese music is produced for its domestic market, but it
also interests audiences in the wider Asian and international spheres.89 As we see,
future music copyright issues are transnational and multicultural. Gigantic tech
companies in China are working to make a virtual environment for music
consumers to access interactive experiences with diverse audiences. 90 Compared
to traditional music services, these new innovations will keep the audience in
contact with each other, not just purely listening to music. 91 However, this new
fashion will make the music market a more comprehensive and complicated
industry. More issues related to young people and the regulations of digital
content will be incorporated into the traditional music business.
No one doubts that the music business in the Mandarin language is a
significant part of the global market, which is characterized by dramatic
expansion, confrontation, engagement, and changes. Mandarin music appeals to a
divergent worldwide market, in contrast to the limited vision of the past several
decades. Over the past decade, from the perspective of culture and technology,
Chinese society has experienced a notable modernization movement regarding the
importance of copyright protection and monetary reward, and this is powered by
the execution of public policy, law, and regulation with the support of the musical
community (i.e., music publishers, record labels, creators, collecting societies, and
all related musical units).92
CRITICAL CONTROVERSIES IN CHINA’S MUSIC MARKET

III.

A. Copyright Amendment and Compulsory Licensing System
2012 was a critical year for the Chinese music industry. The National
Copyright Administration of the People's Republic of China (NCAC) announced
a preparatory sketch for adding articles 46 and 48.93 The new amendment of these
two articles aims to enhance the efficiency of music licensing within the scope of
China’s copyright system. 94 In light of these two articles, music production
companies were allowed to utilize music compositions and transfer them into
sound recordings, provided that these music compositions have been published
for more than three months.95 This licensing progress can also be considered to be
a “compulsory license” because it needs no approval from the individual music
copyright holders or CMOs and has a fixed price set by the NCAC.96 These two
INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS. (IFPI), supra note 79.
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new articles of amendments can be regarded as a further improvement in the
foundation of the current article 40(3) of China’s copyright act, and is comparable
to section 115 of the US copyright law. In the new 2012 amendment, an Extended
Collective License (ECL) is manifested in the specific article 60 of the Chinese
Copyright Act.97 This new step could be seen as a budding advancement of music
licensing in the Chinese music industry. The ECL’s opt-out system might also
overturn the traditional licensing model in the Chinese music market and,
therefore, facilitates discussions and negotiations between users and rights
holders.98
Currently, there are several collecting societies taking charge of separate
categories of copyrights. In terms of music works, the Music Copyright Society of
China (MCSC) began in 1992 by specializing in the music composition license.99
MCSC has been designed as a non-profit organization representing musical artists
and rightsholders, serving to collect and distribute copyright-based revenue. 100
The MCSC is also the earliest established CMO approved by the Chinese
government and the PRC Copyright Law Act. 101 The MCSC had obtained its
membership in the International Confederation of Author and Composers
Societies (CISAC) from 1994 and was a representative of the International
Standard Musical Work Code (ISWC) for the entire Chinese music market in
2009. 102 This is not surprising because the approval of establishment from the
Chinese government allows the MCSC to delegate in the China region from
CISAC and ISWC respectively.103 By 2009, membership of the MCSC reached
5,798, including 355 new members containing 139 lyricists, 200 music composers,
and 5 music publishers. 104 In 2009, the overall royalties were 42.57 million
RMB.105 As the numbers of royalties collected by MCSC continue to increase, it
is undoubted that MCSC has become a crucial intermediary for the Mandarin
music market and the global music economy.106
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The China Audio-Video Copyright Association (CAVCA) was founded in
2008.107 Its main mission is to cluster and distribute the copyright revenue for
creators or rightsholders of audiovisual works. 108 As discussed later, it has
particular relevance to applied audiovisual works, such as karaoke. Based on the
China Copyright Act, with the permission of NCAC, the CAVCA also became the
only CMO responsible for the licensing affairs of audiovisual works. 109 In
particular, CAVCA deals with many categories of rights, including:
(1) the right of public performance; (2) the right of public
presentation; (3) the right of broadcasting; (4) the right of rental; (5)
the right of communication, through information network; (6) the
right of reproduction and distribution; and (7) other copyright and
related rights of audiovisual works.110
In 2011, CAVCA’s repertoire database included more than 120,000 works,
and the total financial benefits from CACVA have reached 117 million RMB.111
CAVCA brings significant influence to the entire Chinese music industry because
its main task is to provide more efficient licensing services for the karaoke
industry. 112 The licensing profits made by a karaoke business can be a major
revenue source for more established and stylish musical artists.113 The economic
value of the karaoke market accounts for a noteworthy proportion for the plenary
music copyright revenue in the whole Chinese region. In 2007, the tariff per
karaoke box was 12 RMB and it was deemed that the royalties of karaoke licenses
should be allocated between MCSC and CAVCA. 114 Specifically, the
fundamental function of a music CMO is comparable to the general CMOs in
individual types of industries. 115 Based on the China Copyright Law, the
establishments of Chinese CMOs should be approved and supervised by the

Reconstruction of Music Copyright Licensing) [音樂著作權許可的制度失靈與法律再造], DANG
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governmental commission, NCAC.116 This background caused all Chinese CMOs
to keep their cordial connections with the government and officials.117
According to a sensible and functional licensing framework, music CMOs
should take responsibility to gather royalties from exploiters and allocate them to
copyright holders based on the rate plan and conditions agreed to by both sides.118
Building reliable data is a fundamental foundation to locate copyright information,
especially when confirming licensing proprietorship and objects and verifying the
proportion of music compositions or lyrics the users exploit.119
In line with China’s Regulations on the Copyrights Collective Administration
(RCCA), music CMOs such as MCSC and CAVCA should offer effective
databases to users to look for copyright information within CMOs’ individual
collections.120 For the licensing process, the copyright information in this database
should include: (1) applicable licensing types of copyright; (2) the name of the
music works or sound recordings; (3) the contact information of the right owners
(for economic rights licensing); (4) designation or identification of composers and
lyricists (for moral rights licensing); and (5) the specific time period of permitted
collective management licenses to CMO. 121 Simultaneously, as exploiters
appropriate music works or sound recordings, it is necessary to define the precise
way their activities should be reported to CMOs, and how the compensation
should be calculated and paid to copyright holders through CMOs.122 In China’s
music market, the repertoire and manageable proficiency of MCSC for music
works and CAVCA for audiovisual is highly influential and relevant to the
function and development of the overall music licensing ecosystem.123
B. Licensing Royalties and Collective Management
MCSC’s licensing royalties have represented a considerable part of musical
artists’ copyright earnings.124 On the basis of MCSC’s annual report, until 2017,
the total collected revenue achieved pretax was 216 million RMB. From 2016 to
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2017, revenues grew 17%.125 This income growth of MCSC originated from the
licensing of performance rights.126
As an example, the remuneration offered by the Shanghai Disney Resort had
acted as a strong boost for MCSC’s licensing business.127 Initially upon gaining
this contract, MCSC researched the business models built by its partnership
societies, CASH (Composers and Authors Society of Hong Kong Limited),
JASRAC (Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers and Publishers),
BMI (Broadcast Music Inc.), ASCAP (American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers) and SACEM (Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers of
Music), and achieved a consensus after over six months of discussions.128 The
MCSC’s cooperation with Disney group brought China a unique opportunity for
leveling up its business strategy by further connecting to the international market.
In addition, the lessons it obtained from this collaboration with Disney group will
stimulate its global vision and allow more transnational licensing in the following
decades.129
Likewise, MCSC is finding a new approach to reinforce the information
infrastructure in response to the rise of the mass digitalization era.130 In addition,
MCSC is considering designing its own coding and data system to establish a
unique music management and licensing culture with Chinese characteristics.131
These developing phenomena in the Chinese internal market could be expanded
to the whole Mandarin market and equipped to be an influential factor in the
global digital music market.132
Underneath the positive appearances, there still are some challenges MCSC
faces with regard to insufficiency of economic incentives and copyright protection
for music creators. According to an academic questionnaire, “the Status of
Musicians' Survival and Copyright Cognition Report” (音樂人生存現況與版權
認知狀況調查研究報告) published in 2018 by Communication University of
China (中國傳媒大學), of the 406 local musicians interviewed, over 60.06% had
never licensed their music works to copyright agencies.133
Surprisingly, although MCSC is the only music collective management
organization in Mainland China, only 12% of respondents were MCSC members
at that time.134 Furthermore, for the respondents who were not members, about
46% were unaware of the existence of the MCSC, and 35% were unmotivated to
participate in the MCSC. 135 This investigation showed that the MCSC had to
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reconsider how to promote its services and establish effective communication to
improve its attractiveness to potential members.
Despite growth in the promising and large Chinese music market, MCSC’s
lack of publicity results in a great gap in the number of members relative to other
main CMOs in the world. The regions which have mature and historic music
licensing mechanisms enjoy at least a tenfold membership advantage over
MCSC.136 For example, ASCAP and BMI have over 70,000 and 90,000 members
respectively, including songwriters, composers and music publishers, while
MCSC merely has about 8,900 members.137 Membership deeply affects CMOs’
efficiency, so MCSC should reconsider how to be a useful agency that connects
musicians and consumers, especially given accessibility to content through digital
platforms.
Figure 9: Relationship between MCSC and Music Creators in China in
2018138

C. Fair Opportunities and Competition on Music Streaming Services
Because of China’s large population, it is uncontroversial that China could
form a sustainable, remunerative market for music creators. In numerous ways,
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Chinese music service companies are combating the accumulated “culture of free
use” and suffering from the difficulties of collecting copyright royalties.139 The
“free use culture” is established when exploiters can simply approach or
download digital songs for free through illegal forums, websites or software.140
Despite this, irritated by expected market expansion, the three biggest players and
enterprises in the Chinese technological markets, including Baidu (百度), Alibaba
(阿里巴巴) and Tencent (騰訊) (sometimes known as “BAT”), are mutual rivals
for the digital music marketplace. By contracting with leading music publishers
and record labels in China, BAT is constructing an individual music repertoire
database for use by over 600 million online consumers in China.141 Moreover,
BAT is aiming to expand their market to digital services related to films, TV
series, programs and on-line game productions, similar to what Google, Amazon
and Apple undertake in the United States. 142 However, their interface leads to
questions of market competition: how to retain their consumers inside the interior
brand structure and how this collective service system inhibits consumers from
reaching the services provided by market competitors outside their service. The
closed model in the Chinese digital music market raises issues of antitrust threats
and hindering the function of a competitive market.143
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Figure 10: Primary Chinese Online Music Services Belong to BAT
(Organized by Author)

In China, QQ Music is the most dominant service provider, with over 200 million
consumers and over 40 million active subscribers.144 QQ Music is comparable to
Spotify. This music licensing model and interface are built by its mother company,
Tencent (騰訊), which offers the leading internet technology in China. 145 QQ
Music is supported by its 2-layer membership. The songs of several big
international record labels such as Warner Music, Sony Music Entertainment,
Universal Music, Taiwan's JVR Music and South Korea’s YG Entertainment have
been added to QQ Music’s repertoire database.146 In contrast to other participants
in music market, QQ Music has more ability to keep and increase subscribers
because its mother company, Tencent, manages the most influential Chinese
communication apps, WeChat ( 微 信 ) and Tencent QQ ( 騰 訊 QQ). 147 They
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respectively have over 500 million active subscribers.148
Figure 11: Leading mobile music platforms in China as of December 2017
by number of monthly active users (in millions)149

1. Abuse of Dominant Position
As stated, the model of QQ Music corresponds to the United States market of
Spotify. Nevertheless, unlike Spotify, Tencent is the leader in Chinese
information technology and holds influential strength on diverse interface and
business fields.150 Tencent’s market position is comparable to the United States’
Apple because Tecent can combine its market strength in different commercial
fields, e.g., Tencent QQ and WeChat, to back QQ Music’s business model. This
market power could possibly cause antitrust issues. For example, in 2015’s
Chinese New Year, Netease Cloud Music (網易音樂), TTPOD Music Small
Shrimp Music (蝦米音樂) and Alipay “red envelope” (阿里紅包) were kept off
the most popular online communication interface, WeChat. 151 In this case,
WeChat apparently assisted its brother company, QQ Music, to reach a better
148
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market position by beating QQ Music’s contestants and stopping Alibaba’s “red
envelope” rewarding and payment systems, which provides services to distribute
the financial rewards of online companions. 152 Consequently, Tencent asserted
that Alibaba relied on WeChat’s interface to strengthen Alibaba’s market
position.153 Additionally, Tencent decided to shut down two of Alibaba’s music
services on the WeChat portal.154 The Chinese government did not intervene in
this dispute to manage this critical issue.155 This conflict between Tencent and
Alibaba Group raised serious discussions by commentators in the region.
Tencent’s block of Alibaba’s music services was criticized and regarded as a
harmful form of market competition. 156 Additionally, the legality of Tecent’s
conduct was also questioned.157 Tencent’s conduct of blocking Alibaba’s music
service cannot pass the antitrust principle’s “reasonableness” test, so this block
may be illegal.158
2. Threats of Monopolies and Debatable Definition of Related Market
Lawmakers should consider a more modern circumscription of “relevant
market.” The torch bearers of information technology, such as China’s Tencent
and the United States’ Apple, Amazon, and Google, hold robust strength in
diverse business areas and hold considerable amounts of data about their user
populations. In China, Tencent’s QQ Music, possesses superior force in the digital
music business, because Tencent can engage its influence on related technical or
business matters, serving to obstruct other market participants and avoid effective
market competition.159
152
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As was observed, “whether Tencent can dominate online music in China—
and get more users to pay—may depend on how well it can take advantage of the
popularity of its messaging and social-networking service.”160 Moreover, in the
absence of diverse and vast related market power, it would be unfair to let a
prevailing participant take advantage of the cooperative interaction among its
related enterprises to gain a privileged position toward opportunities to engage in
a competitive market. This dominance by prevailing market players could block
the function of market competition and cause a severe threat to efficiency. It
would be appropriate to clarify the meaning of “relevant market” by using a more
modern and updated approach, which also considers the market participant’s
substantial influence on the whole social network.161
The trend of “solo or exclusive license model” generated by the technological
giant Tencent had dramatically shocked the music licensing market in China and
caused negative effects to China’s collective management system. Tencent’s
possible abuse of market power from 2016 was threatening China’s national online music business policies by disrupting the structure of the competitive
market. 162 Then, in March 2017, the only Chinese music copyright collecting
society, MCSC, decided to report these anti-competitive behaviors to the
authority, NCAC.163 At several public events, MCSC lodged complaints to the
corresponding official sectors to reveal the serious harm and dangers to the fair
market and the economic incentives of musical artists, resulting from the “solo or
exclusive licensing model” in this digital era. 164 Finally, in September 2017,
NCSC released an administrative instruction for addressing the issues about the
“solo or exclusive license model” and announced that music on-line platforms
such as Tencent should follow these economic orientations. 165 MCSC keeps
aiming to strengthen the accuracy and reliability of the copyright database and
coding system to build a more efficient and competent workflow.166
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13, 2017), https://pandaily.com/tencent-and-alibaba-announces-a-music-copyright-cooperation/
(last accessed Mar. 23, 2021); Staff Writer, Chinese tech giants Alibaba and Tencent to swap
music licensing – Will It Grow The Fast-Expanding Market? THE MUSIC NETWORK (Sep. 13,
2017),
https://themusicnetwork.com/chinese-tech-giants-alibaba-and-tencent-to-swap-musiclicensing-will-it-grow-the-fast-expanding-market/ (last accessed Mar. 23, 2021); Zen Soo, Tencent
to merge QQ Music service with China Music Corp to create streaming giant, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST (Jul. 15, 2016), https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1990254/
tencent-merge-qq-music-service-china-music-corp-create-streaming (last accessed Mar. 23, 2021);
Adam Lashinsky, Alibaba v. Tencent: The Battle for Supremacy in China, FORTUNE (Jun. 21,
2018), http://fortune.com/longform/alibaba-tencent-china-internet/ (last accessed Mar. 23, 2021);
Joshua Franklin, Julia Fioretti, China's Tencent Music raises nearly $1.1 billion in U.S. IPO,
REUTERS (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tencent-music-ipo-idUSKB
N1OA2GRl (last accessed Mar. 23, 2021).
160
LIN, supra note 141, at 203-05; Xiong, supra note 106, at 6-8.
161
LIN, supra note 141, at 205.
162
Id.
163
Id at 203-05.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. at 205-06.

2022]

COPYRIGHT LICENSING AND THE REGULATION OF CHINA’S MUSIC MARKET

115

NCAC justified the compulsory license regime on the basis of anti-monopoly
activity, asserting superiority over the copyright function in the exclusive rights
licensing regime. 167 Nevertheless, this response provoked severe remonstrance
from musical artists and publishers. 168 For the Chinese music market, the
compulsory license mechanism possibly imposes a serious monopolistic issue
because the most influential musical platforms, such as Baidu, Alibaba and
Tencent (BAT), will obtain more controlling market power, since the compulsory
license will enhance their current vast bargaining power.169 Thus, it makes fair
negotiation impossible due to the impaired competitive market and dominant
positions.170 The future risks for the Chinese music market are that compulsory
licensing will strengthen BAT’s market power to a higher level and make their
dominance more stable and fixed. This will cause demonstrable harm to the
prospective income and autonomy of musical artists and worsen the market
failure and the problematic anti-competition situation in the Chinese music
market.171
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRESS

A. The First Amendment
Given China’s contemporary copyright history, it is apparent that the 2001
and 2010 amendments attracted less controversy and less critical disapprobation
through external pressure. 172 In 2001’s version, the copyright reform aimed to
achieve compliance with the qualification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO), while the 2010 modification targeted easing the conflicts between the
U.S. and China within the WTO order.173 Unlike the 2001 and 2010 copyright
regulations’ WTO orientations, the 2012 reform aimed to reconcile the
imbalance between China’s copyright law and the contemporary movements of
commerce, culture and technology in the digital era. It was expected to shift
China’s market economy to a stronger level appropriate for the new era.174
The first draft of the copyright amendment made remarkable modifications to
167
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the existing music copyright law.175 Because of technological advancement and
market expansion, China’s governmental authority proposed to transform the
previous context, structure and approach of the copyright regime into a modern
version of protection and enforcement for the new creative economy.176 While the
existing copyright law merely includes 6 chapters and 61 articles, the first draft of
the copyright amendment incorporated 8 chapters and 88 articles.177
1. Statutory Licensing System
As is common within the wider music industry, statutory licensing aims to
generate more exploitation and the spread of musical creation.178 However, in
terms of realistic operations, because of inefficiencies and non-functionality in the
NCAC copyright clearance mechanism, the current licensing system cannot
ensure musical artists’ copyright compensations will be fully collected and
distributed. 179 Thus, the amendment’s first draft requests the exploiters to
document—using reports first—and then deliver royalty fees into and out of
copyright collecting societies with precise clarification of the users’ content and
purpose. 180 In addition, this first draft offers NCAC the power to execute
sanctions or fines on exploiters who fail to carry out its orders.181 Article 46 of
this first draft specifies that “[a]fter three months from the first publication of a
sound recording, other sound recording producers may use it under the condition
set for statutory license by Article 48.”182 Article 47 of this first draft stipulates
that “[r]adio and television stations may broadcast published works, except
audiovisual works, under the condition set for statutory licenses by Article 48.”183
2. Collective Management Organizations
In order to enhance the prosperous exploitation of the music market, this
initial draft advocates China should establish extended collective licenses (ECL).
175
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In particular, this initial draft allows artists to opt out, to comprehend the nonaffiliated artist’s licensing arrangements, 184 especially through the managerial
function of collecting societies to gather and allocate remuneration.185 Moreover,
within the mechanism of ECL, the price-setting should be administered by a
governmental agency,186 e.g., NCAC and collecting societies such as MCSC and
CAVCA, who exercise the operation of ECL with considerable governmental
supervision. Also, this initial draft suggests launching a specific dispute
settlement system (DSS) for addressing the CMO or user’s petition on setting the
licensing fee. 187 The counterargument against the governmental benchmark of
remuneration should be delivered to a specialized governmental body, such as the
U.S.’s copyright royalty board (CRB), for further consideration.188 Consequently,
the decision approved by the specialized governmental body would be conclusive
and, once the process of assessment starts, the procedure cannot be terminated
until the closing determination.189
3. Governmental Administration and Enforcement
This first draft proposes the modifications below regarding the enforcement of
music infringements. It also advocates that, in cases where the exploiter should
have delivered royalties to a CMO, the binding exploiters are granted immunity
from actual damages of legal litigation. 190 These exploiters should keep
submitting remuneration to the CMO in accordance with the established rate plan
set through governmental administration.191 This modification aims to stimulate
music creators to assign their copyright management to specialized CMOs and to
avoid the troublesome issues of overwhelming and massive legal litigation, with
the potential for variable outcomes, in China’s music marketplace.192
B. The Second Draft Amendment
Surprisingly, the first draft of the copyright amendment of 2012 provoked
intense debate. Until the end of May, 2012, the governmental authority had
obtained over 1,600 responses, many of which were delivered by foreign
184
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companies, artists and organizations.193 In connection to the long-lasting hassle in
China’s music market, these letters and messages mainly focused on arguments
related to the reforms of collecting societies’ statutory licensing, fair remuneration,
exclusive license, on-line platform and steaming services and precise copyright
information and database.194 In response to further examination of professional
research, practical views and open advice from the whole music community,
NCAC arranged the second version of the reform proposal to be issued in July
2012 and sought further feedback.195 This subsequent draft amendment offered
modifications of the most controversial issues in the music industry: the modern
operation of collective management and the statutory license (compulsory license),
located in Articles 46, 47, 48, 60 and 70 of the second draft.196
C. The Third Draft Amendment and Further Developments
In reaction to the aforementioned reform proposals, the government drafted a
new version with a more comprehensive and satisfying view of China’s music
market.197 In order to compile a more convincing draft—as compared to the weak
acceptance seen in early-stage public feedback at the end of 2012—China’s
copyright administration, NCAC, chose to present its self-drafted proposal to the
State Council Legislative Affairs Office ( 國務 院法制辦公室 ), SCLAO, for
preliminary internal evaluation.198 In the summer of 2014, after completing the
preparatory examination and confirmation by SCLAO, the draft initiated by
China’s copyright administration was offered to the music community for public
assessment. 199 However, by this time it had been a while since widespread
discussion in the public media terminated, so this third version of the copyright
reform is still pending, awaiting approval of the highest policy-making institution,
the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of China (全國人民代表大
會).200
D. New Lessons: Transnational Experiences, Aspirations and Challenges
Musicians in China had great concerns about Article 46 of the initial draft of
the copyright amendment, since it would allow rightsholders to exploit musical
193

Tian et al., supra note 9, at 242.
Id.
195
Id. at 242-43.
196
Id.; Sun Li- ping, Huang An-qi, Luo Zheng-guang ( 孫 麗 萍 、 黃 安 琪 、 羅 爭 光 ),
Zhezuoquanfa “Da Xiu” Re Zhengyi “Jiti Guanli” Shi Liangyao Haishi “Si Xue” The Amendment
of Copyright Law provokes controversy. "Collective Management" is A Good Medicine or a
"Dead Hole" [著作權法“大修”惹爭議 “集體管理”是良藥還是“死穴”], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
(新華社) (Apr. 25, 2012), https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2012/04/id/511154.shtml (last
visited Mar. 23, 2021).
197
Tian et al., supra note 9, at 156.
198
Id. at 156-57.
199
Id. at 157.
200
Id.
194

2022]

COPYRIGHT LICENSING AND THE REGULATION OF CHINA’S MUSIC MARKET

119

compositions or lyrics based on a previously published sound recording released
to the public market for more than three months.201 Specifically, China’s music
community argued that the proposed phase of three months was too limited for
music copyright holders and tit would harm the competence of exclusivity on
which musical creators rely.202 In addition, Chinese musicians argued that their
property rights would be impaired under the punitive terms of the proposed
Article 46. 203 Furthermore, musicians argued that funding to support the
continuing creation of musical compositions and lyrics would shrink due to the
lack of copyright protection.204
On the other hand, a considerable number of academics and professionals in
copyright law presented opposing opinions to counter the music community’s
assertions about the proposed Article 46. 205 Academics’ professional analysis
identified other countries in which statutory licenses functioned satisfactorily to
avert antitrust issues in the digital age, notably issues caused by record labels and
music publishers.206 However, the pressure from China’s music community was
overwhelming and the proposed Article 46 of the statutory license was
abandoned.207
Musicians also voiced objections to the second draft’s possible establishment
of an ECL.208 From their perspective, an ECL would empower societies’ controls
over their copyrights and continue narrowing musicians’ autonomy in managing
their property rights.209 To compromise with the music community, the second
draft restricted the implementation of ECL to published musical works broadcast
over radio and television stations and published musical works disseminated
through private karaoke equipment.210
The ECL system might be defeated entirely if a musician’s intention to optout of the system is firm. This weakness of the ECL system might be raised in
court when approving comparatively higher compensations to non-affiliated
artists than they would be able to seek from the ECL system. This negative
201
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outcome might result in a failure to keep the ECL system robust. It also results in
“an opting-out trend” and “a collapse of the ECL system.”211 Therefore, to issue
actual damages in court, or to compensate the rightsholders as if they are affiliated
to CMOs, it will be necessary to maintain the ECL system, thereby reinforcing the
health of the music ecosystem. This is exactly what the Nordic nations have tried
very hard to achieve over the last few years. 212 In the United States, Sound
Exchange seems to address similar issues through a system like the ECL
system.213 The difference is that the United States created a separate organization
to manage licensing affairs related to non-affiliated artists of CMOs.214 Whether
looking to ECL, Sound Exchange, or MCL, all provide a new way of thinking to
enhance the current licensing system in the Chinese music market. A more
advanced licensing mechanism like ECL or Sound Exchange should be adopted in
China to move the traditional licensing philosophy forward and reduce the
massive amounts of litigation by non-affiliated artists.215
In terms of efficiency, compulsory licenses might be regarded as a temporary
pathway, because they could cause the deformation of the competitive market, in
which case no other means could be applied.216 In this situation, the government
might need to act to avoid market failure. However, at present, it seems that
digital music dissemination does not inherently cause market failure. Thus,
supporting conduct from the governmental administration (such as compulsory
licensing) is unnecessary. The preservation of the foundation of copyright,
property and contract doctrine, can build and shape positive market function
without government intervention. This could be a more reasonable approach than
any government conduct to reregulate market interference by the exclusive right
of intellectual property law. There is no doubt property rights retain a
considerable amount of exclusiveness and dominance, even if limits have been
designed against abuse. However, the shadow of comprehensive control is what
threatens the public community.
The government’s control mechanism will be counter-effective if it inhibits
artists from drawing inspiration from an original creation to establish a new work
or prohibits artists from drawing extensive reference to the plot or content of an
artistic work for discussion and critique purposes. The expression divide or ideaexpression dichotomy principle should apply.217
Using modern technology, it is believed that the digital format of music and
sound recording can be confined, but it is impossible to avoid all meta-level
discussion about digital content within commentary, appreciations, and social
211

Liu, supra note 4, at 1474.
Id. at 1481; Xiong, supra note 115, at 90-93.
213
Liu, supra note 4, at 1474; Xiong Qi (熊琦), 美國音樂版權制度轉型經驗的梳解與借鑒
[Combing and Learning from the Transformation Experience of American Music Copyright
System], 3 環球法律評論 [GLOBAL L. REV.], 142, 145-148 (2014).
214
Merges, supra note 1, at 11.
215
Jiang & Gervais, supra note 4, at 228.
216
Merges, supra note 1, at 11-12.
217
See Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the
Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV., 995, 998 (2003).
212

2022]

COPYRIGHT LICENSING AND THE REGULATION OF CHINA’S MUSIC MARKET

121

discourse.218 Without a doubt, as technology keeps advancing, the authority will
be capable of putting all efforts to inspect all users’ works to deter any possible
illegal conduct, and to maintain an enhanced environment for copyright
protection.219 This excessive control, like compulsory licensing, will surely cause
overwhelming costs and cannot be afforded by the market economy. Therefore,
this kind of excessive control is impractical, given its relative cost compared to
the cost of production and the margins earned by rightsholders during commercial
exploitation of their works.220
E. Compliance with International Treaties: The Berne Convention’s Three-Step
Test
The ECL bill of China presumably engages a change to breach the three-step
test,221 found in the discussion of exclusive rights of reproduction under Article
9(2) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works in
1967:
Right of Reproduction: 1. Generally; 2. Possible exceptions; 3.
Sound and visual recordings - (1) Authors of literary and artistic
works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right
of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or
form. (2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the
Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special
cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a
normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. (3) Any sound or
visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction for the
purposes of this Convention.222
In addition, the test as included in Article 13 of TRIPs reads: “Members shall
confine limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rights holder.”223
As the body of the WTO illustrates, regarding the primary stage of the threestep test, “certain special cases” demand irregularity and the barrier should be
clarified and controlled within the appropriate and reasonable range and filed.224
In particular, the commercial immunity subordinate to the United States
representing copyright law was notified to counter the initial requirement
218
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restricting “certain cases.” 225 In particular, Chinese music CMO and MCSC
enrolled only 9% of total Chinese creators as affiliates. Broadening identification
is enforced for creators in the Chinese music market.226 This legal conduct could
be capable of exploiting the authorship exclusivity in over 90% of nonaffiliated
creators.227 For that reason, it is believed that the lion’s share cannot be counted as
constituting “certain special cases.”228
Moreover, according to the 1909 Chinese Copyright Act, diffusion of
copyrighted sound recordings by TV and radio signals is a non-commercial use
and, consequently, is excluded from being the basis of a copyright infringement
allegation.229 This immunity was incompatible with the three-step test subject to
the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. 230 In 2001, the Chinese
administration shifted this exclusion to the compulsory license regime of
copyright law.231 This amendment was enacted just prior to the date of December
11, when China’s WTO accession was announced. 232 It states that “[r]adio and
television stations may broadcast published sound recordings without the
permission of copyright owners but shall pay remunerations, unless the relevant
parties have agreed otherwise. Detailed measure shall be formulated by the State
Council.”233
Nevertheless, after the ratification of the involuntary license proposal, the
PRC’s broadcasting associations had been pressured to prevent the establishment
of a practical scheme that specifies explicit regulations and operations. 234
Throughout this process, the PRC’s TV and radio stations continued to broadcast
musical works and sound recording without charge. 235 In 2010, radio and TV
stations of the PRC finally initiated licensing bargaining with the record labels,
the music collective management organizations, and the MSCS. 236 This
background serves as a lesson for the music market by showing the
ineffectiveness of a compulsory licensing regime under the reality of politics.237
Due to formidable protest from musical creators, publishers, and record labels
in the Chinese market, the 2012 Chinese copyright amendment completely
abrogated the compulsory licensing mechanism within PRC’s copyright law,
notwithstanding the rights of musical works or any current living articles.238 In
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light of the United States’ Music Modernization Act,239 the notion of compulsory
licensing has reached the public eye and has been a recurring topic in the music
industry.240
Even though these copyright rewards are the product of local and overseas
creators, merely local creators are offered a route to access these resources.241
However, this outcome causes protectionism to occur within the structure of
international trade and contravenes the essence of national treatment on the basis
of the TRIPS agreement and the Berne Convention.242
F. Thorny Problem: Common Law Traditions and Moral Rights
It is crucial for this analysis to distinguish between the United States’ and
China’s copyright systems. This study has identified essential points of
divergence and demonstrates how individual solutions could be meaningful and
practical to address similar circumstances by treating analogous cases alike in the
United States and China.243 On the basis of European law tradition, China adopts
a moral rights system to form and regulate one side of its copyright law structure,
in contrast to the United States more purely economic rights system. 244 This
distinction results in several substantive differences between the United States’
and China’s respective copyright regimes.245
First, in China’s copyright law, the idea of moral rights can be exerted for all
types of copyrightable works, indicated in Article 3. 246 Were it otherwise, the
notion of a moral right would be comparatively narrowed only to specific creation
categories in visual art.247
Second, in China’s copyright system, the rights of integrity, revision,
authorship, and publication are all incorporated in the moral rights framework,
whereas, in the United States copyright system, the concept of moral rights is
barely considered and focuses exclusively on the rights of integrity and
attribution.248 Compared to the United States’ economic rights system, and simply
by design, the ECL and compulsory licensing fits less naturally into China’s
moral rights system. With more rights to incorporate, it is more challenging to
incorporate compulsory licensing and the ECL system in China.
Since PRC’s governance transformed ancient China from a dispersed and
divided amalgam to a centralized and ordered union, China has expressed not just
239
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its ambition against western powers, but also a desire to integrate Asia's
economy.249 Externally and internally motivated, China is continuously adjusting
its copyright to harmonize with international requirements and local demands.250
China revised its communist economic system through efficient political and
administrative reconstruction. 251 The modernization of legal institutions
encouraged Chinese governmental authorities to execute logical and systematic
policy-making and law enforcement. 252 Subsequently, new technology and
business models transferred expeditious innovation to digital and virtual products
and services.253 The internet has intensively remodeled the culture and society of
creation and use, contrary to printing and reading in the traditional printed manner.
China’s broader copyright law is influenced and increasingly altered by modern
civilization.
However, despite two crucial reforms in 2001 and 2010, the narrow local
vision limited the amendment's potential and possibilities of the future
amendments. Essentially, the copyright reform in 2001 was aimed to force the
PRC into compliance with the WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty
(WPPT) and World Copyright Treaty (WCT).254 This international IP movement
equipped and empowered the PRC with a protective and strong IP structure,
allowing it to adhere to worldwide trade prerequisites and communicate and open
global export and import markets. Nevertheless, facing dramatic social, political,
and economical transformation, the Chinese music community expressed concern
about the long-existing copyright protection mechanism. 255 Many feel that it
cannot react and absorb continual technological impacts and challenges.256 Music
copyright enforcement is unable to deter increasing infringements, resulting in
lower motivation and less innovation and creativity. 257 Therefore, under the
pressure of external and internal provocation, new modernization of copyright
laws represents a fundamental driver towards equity between composers,
performers, producers, distributors, and broadcasters.258
CONCLUSION
A. Inevitable Weakness: Legislative Delay and Inflexible Regulation
Without the support and flexibility of the free market, compulsory licenses are
a static model that can produce an awkward issue: outmoded (i.e., fixed) and
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unintended consequences.259 Specifically, lawmaking makes the legislation turn to
persistent and stubborn agreements or contracts, precluding the possibility of
negotiations. The inflexibility and irreversibility within the compulsory license
results in few adjustments to new developments in the market economy.260 Market
entrants are left to contend with obsolete rate arrangements or “legislative
delay.”261
Legislative delay illustrates why the price-setting process within the
compulsory license system cannot react to immediate changes in the market
economy. Rates built on a compulsory license may be way below a price linked to
the free market.262 For instance, the government rate on compulsory license of
sound recording resulted in no differences between the 1909 Copyright Act and
the 1976 Copyright Act. Yet, throughout the mass medium boom, there was a
large increase in the music production market. 263 The compulsory license has
depressed the value of the musical compositions and sound recordings market.264
Consequently, by providing less compensation than users and creators generally
expect, this tendency to underestimate value has generally decreased people’s
desire to create musical and recorded works.265
If the intention to opt out of the system was firm, the ECL system might be
defeated. Creators' reluctance to resist may disappear when the court approves
higher compensations for non-affiliated artists than could be earned under the
ECL system.266 This might result in failure to keep the ECL alive. Nordic nations
have tried very hard over the past years to maintain the health of the musical
ecosystem. 267 The ECL will need to be run stably to issue actual damages to
rightsholders as if they were affiliated with CMOs.268
In terms of efficiency, compulsory licenses might be regarded as a possible
and temporary pathway. Serious problems cause the deformation of the
competitive market if no other means could be applied, given the
unresponsiveness to market factors.269 At its extreme, the government might need
to execute actions to avoid market failure. However, it seems that the
circumstance of digital music dissemination has not inherently induced market
failure. 270 And, thus, supporting conduct from the governmental administration
259
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(such as a compulsory license) is unneeded.271 The preservation of the effectual
foundations of property rights and contracts are able to build and shape positive
market function.
This pathway can be a more reasonable approach than any governmental
market conduct to reregulate the market interference by the exclusive right of
intellectual property law. It is no doubt that property rights retain a considerable
amount of exclusiveness and dominance, even if limits have been designed
against the abuse. 272 However, the shadow of comprehensive control is what
threatens the public community.273
Because of the control, it will be extremely costly to try to design and manage
a social system for copyright owners to prohibit users from referring to the plot or
content of artistic works in a discussion with non-users or imitating general ideas
from an original creation to establish a new work due to the idea-expression
divide or idea-expression dichotomy principle. 274 Modern technology makes it
possible to confine the digital format of music works and sound recordings, but it
is impossible to censor and avoid all the sharing about references or imitations of
these digital contents within commentary, appreciations and intercourse. 275
Without a doubt, as technology keeps advancing, diverse authorities will be
capable of putting all efforts into inspecting all users to deter any possible illegal
activities and aiming to maintain a spotless environment for copyright protection
(as per the relevant government rules and laws. 276 This excessive control, like
compulsory licensing, will surely incur extensive costs and cannot be afforded by
the market economy. 277 Therefore, this kind of excessive control is obviously
costly and impossible.278
B. Stimulating Transactional Efficiency
In the spirit of fair rewards, the two emerging regimes, “Compulsory License
and Extended Collective License,” are considered to uphold the middle class and
close the divide between content suppliers and musical creators in the digital
era.279 Having said that, statistics indicates that individuals continue to bargain
contracts with copyright holders toward compulsory license.280 Notwithstanding
17 U.S.C. § 115 (Compulsory Licenses on Mechanical Rights), the Harry Fox
Agency (HFA), a primary supplier of mechanical rights on sound recordings and
collecting intermediary and allocator of mechanical royalties on behalf of the
271
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United States’ music publishers, is a renowned case in point. In numerous
respects, in addition to the compulsory license system in the United States, the
music market finds a deficient situation in wiping out transactional costs, but this
licensing approach still results in extravagant rent-seeking by trying to persuade
the Senate and House of Representatives for advantageous price and
conditions.281 Therefore, in comparison to contract negotiation in the free market,
the accumulation of the expenditure of rent-seeking and unremoved transactional
costs can possibly make the model of compulsory licensing bothersome,
troublesome and costly.282
The rate formula processed and approved by the administration and legislature
cannot generate impartial compensations for musical creators to access specific
gravity on the price within the market competition.283 In support of individual
creators, the latter information and communication advances have lowered
economic barriers to enter the music fostered a diverse and open environment for
building multiple and mixed commercial channels.284
Specifically, the Nordic countries, such as Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden, initially framed the ECL system. 285 Compared to the
compulsory license structure launched by the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) 286 and the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Work, 287 the ECL
mechanism is a substitute for empowering a recognition linking a collective
management organization and its licensees to be obligatory on nonaffiliated
creators.
Hypothetically, if the representation of a collective management organization
is widespread, comprehensive, and competent, the ECL mechanism could have
the least influence on the competitive economy. Controversially, the advocates for
the ECL are usually the fledgling and immature collecting societies which still
have not gathered adequate registers, and so far, been situated in a market share
monopolized through the considerable quantity of overseas or nonaffiliated
subjects.288 Presently, by means of upgrading competitive markets and lowering
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transactional costs, the ECL channel has represented concrete answers to back
extensive utilization of authorized musical creation.289
Within the United States’ competitive economy, the music copyright
collectives (e.g., BMI, ASCAP and SESAC (PRO), HFA and SoundExchange),
convey essential free expression to their reuse.290 According to the blanket license,
the bundling mechanism efficiently transits the right of secondary exercises to
musical creators by streamlining transactional costs. 291 In China’s market,
indemnification provisions are typically covered in the copyright collectives’
licenses for safeguarding and keeping affiliated members sheltered from the
economic harm caused by legal actions of non-affiliated copyright holders. 292
Consequently, the essential concern regarding the ECL model, the goal of China’s,
is that by persuading the congress and administration, turns into a negative skill,
potentially achieving abuse of monopoly power. 293 However, the merits of
enhancing considerably the quantity of memberships for improving the
administration and fostering the competence of functioning could remain in vain.
C. Ensuring Fair Compensation: Transparency and Accountability
Three principal reasons cause the abuse of monopoly power in music market:
(1) a turndown to authorize specific exploitation of copyright, in the absence of
rational grounds; (2) arbitrarily determining licensing fees and terms, unescorted
by adequate and legal negotiation processes; and (3) inappropriate prejudice
regarding two separate applications of identical licensing objects.294
It is probably troublesome to think that when copyright management markets
were forming, collecting societies were achieving significant market power, and
this could result in abuse through denial of licenses, or prejudice toward
exploiters. Additionally, it is also hard to define if licensing fees and terms have
been decided arbitrarily or deprived of sensible circumstances. In China’s music
market, it is unnatural that the price proposed by copyright collecting societies is
constantly corresponding to the one approved by the governmental authority
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NCAC. 295 For instance, the copyright licensing tariff of Chinese karaoke
businesses, affirmed by NCAC, was routinely matching the amount proposed by
the music copyright collecting society, Music Copyright Society of China
(MCSC), and the audiovisual copyright collecting society, China Audio-Video
Copyright Association (CACVA).296
This coincidence reveals the forming of a licensing tariff, in the absence of
“due process,” risks harming the music ecosystem, due to inadequate transparency
and the failure of competitive market function. In fact, in China, the criterion of a
licensing tariff declared and approved by NCAC is eventually a formalization and
accreditation of copyright collecting societies’ motions. 297 The capability of
governmental supervision is deficient, and this leads to the high probability of
market power abuse.298 The occurrence of abuse therefore causes inefficiency in
the Mandarin music free market. Moreover, compared to the global level, the
music licensing rate in China appears to be depressed.299 Specifically, in China,
the price policy for broadcast rights licenses leans toward supporting the
extensive exploitation facilitated by the TV and radio stations, and results in
lower licensing rates than the global level. In addition, the implementation of
“sub-entrusting” also leads to a severe enlargement of transactional costs. 300
Greater complexity transpires through such a licensing process, since “subentrusting,” though arbitrary manipulations on licensing terms and rate, possibly
causes monopoly power abuse.301
“Transparency” and “openness” will be essential factors to enhance licensing
efficiency in China’s music market. When specifying the licensing tariff of
musical works and sound recordings, public hearings will be necessary for the
interest groups, users, copyright holders and intermediaries to speak out about
their opinions and concerns. Open discussions and interaction will also be helpful
for governmental authorities to gather positive or negative feedback to improve
and reexamine its tariff proposal. On-line surveys, e-mails and web conferences
will be practical methods to obtain diverse ideas and suggestions from the public
music community. The communication among users, artists and middlemen can
play a significant role to ease the intense between copyright owners and users and
promote pragmatic copyright policy. Thus, rebuilding “due process” and “open
discussions” on the process of price-setting will be imperative for a more
transparent and efficient music ecosystem.
At this point, the focus shifts to why the Chinese government should generate
sufficient supervision toward a collective copyright management system.
Competent supervision will bring transparency and openness to China’s music
and audiovisual collecting societies. Consequently, reaching future modernization
on music copyrights, China can confidently build an efficient licensing system to
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foster a thriving music market, affording transparent domestic and international
access to producers and consumers.

